A Chinese university with deep ties to the People's Liberation Army bought Nvidia H200 chips last month even though it sits on a US export blacklist. Procurement records show that Northwestern Polytechnical University, a member of China's "Seven Sons of National Defense" group, paid 874,700 yuan ($123,000) for two H200 chips on October 21, buying them from Shaanxi Bosuan Network Technology rather than from Nvidia directly. The purchase is not a loophole buried in fine print. It is the policy working as its critics feared it would not.
The university's exposure is not confined to one transaction. The records show it also bought access this year to H200 and other powerful Nvidia processors through five contracts for rented computing capacity. Its cybersecurity school awarded two seven-month contracts in January for access to servers containing eight H200 chips each, worth 441,700 yuan and 441,000 yuan, for fine-tuning AI models and reinforcement-learning training. The January licensing rules were supposed to require safeguards preventing blacklisted entities and military end-users from remotely accessing chips exported under the policy. Those safeguards did not stop a blacklisted institution from renting that very capability.
Reuters reviewed 26 Chinese procurement and corporate records and found other universities and research institutions buying or renting restricted Nvidia hardware through domestic suppliers. Shenzhen University bought three H100 processors for 769,800 yuan in September. Beihang University, another Seven Sons institution with close ties to China's aerospace and defence industries, bought four A800 processors for 489,000 yuan in April. The suppliers receiving these awards were, in the report's words, "little-known" technology companies, and the records offered scant information about where the processors came from or where the rented servers operated.
Nvidia's chief executive, Jensen Huang, has argued that continued US sales to China preserve American technological leadership and keep Chinese customers dependent on US technology. That argument deserves a hard look now. If the most sensitive customers can still reach the most capable chips through intermediaries, then the choice is not between selling and withholding. It is between selling with enforceable controls and selling into a gray market that Washington cannot see. Three Republican committee chairmen have asked Huang for a briefing on November 18 about his reported contacts with an alleged Chinese intelligence operative, and that request is the right place to start.
Congress should not wait for another procurement record to surface. Lawmakers from both parties have already called for chip-tracking requirements and greater congressional oversight of exports, and this report shows why those demands are no longer theoretical. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security should explain how a blacklisted university obtained H200 access under a licensing regime that was supposed to forbid it. Until that question has a clear answer, claims that current controls are working should be treated with suspicion.